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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXII DECEMBER, 1936 NUMBER I
THE CODE "CAUSE OF ACTION": ITS DEFINITION
CARL C. WHEATON
Of what does a "cause of action" consist? What are its elements? What
is its breadth? For centuries those questions have been asked by lawyers,
and legal writers have answered them in all conceivable ways. A new in-
terest in the meaning of the term as it is used in pleading codes has been
awakened during the last few years by the writings of Dean Charles E.
Clark of Yale University School of Law, whose opinions are always worthy
of consideration.
The primary purposes of this article are to state Dean Clark's concep-
tion of a "cause of action", to analyze the authorities which he cites to sup-
port his ideas as to its meaning, to determine whether or not they support
his views, and to investigate the possibility or impossibility of the applica-
tion of his conclusions to the present law.
As early as 1924, Dean Clark wrote:
"It was a deadly sin to plead law; what was necessary was to set
forth the facts and these constituted the cause of action. . . . The
cause of action is the group of operative facts giving cause or ground
for judicial interference. . ... We may . . . accept the view that the
cause of action is an aggregate of operative facts, a series of acts or
events, which gives rise to one or more legal relations of right-duty
enforceable in the courts."'
In his book on Code Pleading, published in 1928, Dean Clark says:
"The codifiers seem to have had in mind the cause of action as con-
sisting of facts which should afford ground or occasion for the court to
give judicial relief of some kind, but as not limiting the form or
amount of such relief. This is shown by their emphasis upon 'the facts'
as 'constituting the cause of action' and upon their attempt to get away
from the legal subdivisions of the previous systems and to keep legal
theories of recovery out of the pleadings proper. And this idea seems
to afford the most flexible and workable definition of the term for use
on the various occasions where it is incorporated into procedural rules.
The cause of action must, therefore, be such an aggregate of opera-
tive facts as will give rise to at least one right of action, but it is not
limited to a single right (if it is ever possible to isolate one such right
from others.) The extent of the cause is to be determined pragmati-
'The Code Cause of Action (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817.
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cally by the court, having in mind the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. Such extent may be settled by past precedents, but the
controlling factor will be the matter of trial convenience, for that is
the general purpose to be subserved by the procedural rules. Such pur-
pose should be considered, not from the vantage point of the study, but
from the courtroom, looking at the facts as they will be presented at
the actual trial. This means a lay or non-legal grouping of the facts
into a single unit, as non-professional witnesses would naturally do,
will be the most practical. The cause will, therefore, comprise the ma-
terial facts of the happening or affair or affairs giving rise to the dis-
pute, or, as sometimes expressed, the 'defendant's wrongful act' to
which is added also the necessary background of events showing its
wrongful nature. Cause will differ from other code terms-same trans-
action, or transactions connected with the same subject of action-
not in kind, but merely in extent.' 2
Do the authorities cited by the author, and existing when he gave utter-
ance to his complete idea of the significance of "cause of action" under the
codes, sustain his view? The only way in which this can properly be deter-
mined is to investigate each authority he adduces. This we may proceed
to do.
The first type of case to be considered deals with representative suits.
In Commonwealth to the use of Wiggins v. Scott,3 some taxpayers were
allowed to sue for all who paid a particular tax to recover taxes paid and
alleged to have been exacted illegally. The court said that "the individual
right of the one to maintain his own lawsuit must yield to the greater rights
of all and the public, where its treasury and common weal were so affect-
ed." 3a Dean Clark refers to other similar cases.4 These suits were not al-
lowed on the ground that there was but a single cause of action. Rather,
each of those sued or suing was treated as having a separate cause of ac-
tion, but representative proceedings were permitted to avoid a multiplicity
of suits. In most cases various causes of action were consolidated. The
courts at no place in these decisions say anything which would lead one to
believe they are adopting Dean Clark's view as to the breadth of a cause
of action. But that is not the only reason why the writer believes they had
no idea of enunciating such a doctrine. The fact is that for generations be-
fore these cases were decided, judges had held in similar situations that
several causes of action existed, but that suits might be brought or defend-
ed by representation.
'Pp. 83-85.
3112 Ky. 252, 65 S. W. 596, 55 L. R. A: 597 (1901).
31d. at 265, 65 S. W. at 599.
'Carlton v. Newman, 77 Me. 408, 1 Atl. 194 (1885); Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeo-
mans, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 8 (1866).
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Many cases of joint defendants demand consideration.5 The Debris Case6
is typical. In that suit, an owner of riparian land claimed that he was in-
jured by several persons who were throwing debris into the river which
passed his land. The court permitted the joinder of the alleged wrongdoers
on the ground that they were acting jointly. Each of the cases in this group
can be explained on the theory that the defendants have committed joint
torts. In such situations the substantive law is that the joint tortfeasors may
be sued together, on the ground that the injured party should be permitted
to treat them as having committed one tort because they acted in unison in
causing a single wrong.
Evergreen Cemetery Assn v. Beecher7 was a proceeding in which the
plaintiff was authorized to sue several owners of separate parcels of land
to get their tracts for cemetery purposes. The court said this was proper,
for it was within the spirit of the practice act, as it would promote speedy,
complete, and inexpensive justice without placing any obstruction in the
way of any defendant in protecting his rights. The court added that each
defendant carried his own burden only. This last statement, especially, tells
us that the judges did not treat the plaintiff as having but a single cause of
action against all of the defendants.
Let us now discuss a group of decisions in which the interests of the de-
fendants are adverse to those of the complaining party. Since different
reasons for the results are given in each opinion, we discuss them separately.
In Board of Supervisors of Saratoga County v. Deyoe,8 the treasurer of
Saratoga County issued notes, some authorized, others unauthorized. Over
thirty of more than fifty holders of these notes had sued separately there-
on, and others threatened to do likewise. The court permitted the plaintiff
to join in one proceeding all of the holders of the notes issued by the treas-
urer to determine to whom the county owed the money, likening the pro-
ceeding to a bill of peace to prevent a multiplicity of suits. The court does
state that it would allow such a suit "to determine the right of all claim-
ants in a single action".sa The decision does not definitely state that "action"
means "cause of action", and "action" may well have been used to mean
"suit". If that is true, this proceeding is merely one in which defendants
having separate interests adverse to the plaintiff's may be joined; otherwise,
'The Debris Case, 16 Fed. 25 (C. C. Cal. 1883) ; Howse v. Moody, 14 Fla. 59 (1872) ;
Mitchell v. Bank of St Paul, 7 Minn. 252 (1862); Bateman v. Forty-Second St. M. &
St. N. Ave. Ry. Co., 5 N. Y. Supp. 13 (Common Pleas 1889); Lynch v. Elektron Mfg.
Co., 94 App. Div. 408, 88 N.Y. Supp. 70 (lst Dept. 1904) ; Sartori v. Litchfield Con-
struction Co., 149 App. Div. 241, 133 N.Y. Supp. 720 (2d Dept. 1912); Winslow v.
Dousman, 18 Wis. 456 (1864); Blake v. VanTilborg, 21 Wis. 672 (1867).
'Supra note 5.
'53 Conn. 551, 5 Atl. 353 (1886).
'77 N.Y. 219 (1879).
"Id. at 225.
4 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the decision by inference supports Dean Clark's view of the span of a cause
of action.
Another instance of this kind is found in N. Y. etc. R. Co. v. Schuy-
ler.9 In that case the plaintiff was allowed to join as defendants a large
number of holders of false certificates having a common origin and com-
mon ground of validity, though they became owners under different cir-
cumstances and conveyances and claimed different rights. The suit was
brought to have the certificates decreed illegal and void and to have them
ordered surrendered and canceled. The court said this was proper because
there was "a single interest in the plaintiffs directly opposed to the interest
of all the defendants". 9a
McHenry v. Hazard'o is a further illustration of this doctrine. Two
persons had sued the plaintiff to enforce an obligation which each claimed
by assignment. The court consented to their joinder as defendants in a
suit to cancel the obligation on the ground of fraud. Otherwise, the plaintiff
would have to sue in different actions, for recovery against one defend-
ant would not bar the claim of the other. This would subject the plaintiff
to the expense of double litigation, to the hazard of double recovery,
and to the annoyance of two trials to secure a single right. The state-
ment that a recovery against one defendant would not bar the claim of
the other one indicates that the court thought their claims separate. Of
course, the plaintiff had but a single right if the obligation was invalid.
That was a right not to pay anything on it, but that does not mean
he had but a single cause of action against the defendants, or that they
had only one cause of action against him. It is believed that these cases
are all properly explained on the adverse interest doctrine, though there
may be some doubt about Board of Saratoga County v. Deyoe.1O
A single adjudication depended upon by Dean Clark rests definitely upon
the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions. This is Black v. Shreeve", in
which various parties to an agreement each promised that those of them
who were solvent should bear equally with the complainants any loss suf-
fered by the latter on a loan by the complainants to C Company. The court
decided that all of the promisors should be sued to avoid a multiplicity of
actions; it did not say, however, that the complainants had but a single
cause of action against the obligors. The case may and should be explained
on the theory that, though those suing had separate causes of action against
each debtor, it is fair procedural law to clear up the whole controversy in
one lawsuit.
Several cases upon which Dean Clark relies involve statutes. Akely v.
'17 N.Y. 592 (1858).
'Id. at 608.
"45 N.Y. 580 (1871).
", Supra note 8.
1'7 N.J. Eq. 440 (1848).
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Kinnicutt 2 permitted nearly two hundred people claiming separate causes
of action to join in one complaint in a proceeding against the defendants to
obtain compensation for injuries caused by the alleged fraud of the defend-
ants. This result was based on a statute providing:
"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions is alleged to exist whether jointly, severally or
in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate actions any
common question of law or fact would arise."13
Green v. Knox 14 declared that a taxpayer of a city could sue various
police officers and officials of the municipality to restrain payment of the
salaries of the policemen. The holding was based upon the following sta-
tutes:
"Any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an in-
terest in a controversy, adverse to the plaintiff, or who is a necessary
party defendant, for the complete determination or settlement of a
question involved therein .... "15
"The court may determine the controversy, as between parties be-
fore it, where it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others,
or by saving their rights, but where a complete determination of the
controversy cannot be had without the presence of other parties, the
court must direct them to be brought in."16
The court stated that these enactments authorized "the joinder as de-
fendants of persons whose separate interests spring from a common cause,
in such a wty that an adjudication upon their several rights cannot be had
without the determination of the fundamental question upon which the
rights of all depend". 16a This, said the court, was a case which that idea
fitted. Other cases involving adverse interest statutes 17 are Town of Fair-
field v. Southport National Bank'8 and E. B. Eames & Co. v. Mayo.19 The
final holding in this unit of cases is Alinquist v. Wilcox.2° A Minnesota
statute2' vested a single cause of action in the personal representative of
one who was killed. The court said:
"The action is statutory and in no respect founded upon, governed,
or controlled by rules of common law applicable to personal torts ...
-238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682 (1924).
"N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr (1920) § 209.
1175 N.Y. 432, 67 N.E. 910 (1903).
'IN. Y. CODE Civ. PRO. (1877, as amended) § 447.
'N. Y. CODE Civ. PRO. (1877, as amended) §452.
'175 N.Y. at 434, 67 N. E. at 910.
"CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1902) § 618 and CONN. GEN. STAT. (1918) § 5641.
"77 Conn. 423, 59 AtI. 513 (1904).
"93 Conn. 479, 106 AtI. 825 (1919).
'115 Minn. 37, 131 N.W. 796 (1911).
"MINN. REV. LAWS (1905) § 4503.
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One cause of action is created, and only one, and all persons whose
Wrongful act contributed to cause the death may be joined as defend-
ants therein.'2 1 a
None of the cases discussed in this paragraph sustain Dean Clark's defi-
nition of "cause of action". They all are based upon specific statutes that
make no attempt to determine the meaning of "cause of action".
Another list of cases 22 to be considered deals with the granting of various
types of relief where there is a single cause of action. Two examples will
suffice. In Hahl v. Sugo,23 it was claimed that the defendant improperly
built over onto the plaintiff's land. The'court stated that there was but a
single cause of action and that all relief desired must be obtained in one
trial. One cannot quarrel with this, for, as the court said:
"The facts alleged show one primary right of the plaintiffs and one
wrong done by the defendant which involves that right. Therefore,
the plaintiffs have stated but a single cause of action, no matter how
many forms and kinds of relief they may be entitled to. The relief
prayed for, or to which they may be entitled, is no part of their cause
of action. Pomeroy's Code Remedies, §455.' ' 23a
It is interesting to notice that this case talks of a primary right and refers
to Pomeroy. This causes one to wonder why Dean Clark should have men-
tioned this decision as one supporting his view, for he certainly does not
follow Pomeroy's idea of "cause of action". It was held in Reichert v.
Stilwel124 that only one cause of action was set forth in a suit to foreclose
a mortgage, though the court was permitted by statute to render a defi-
ciency judgment, for that decree was an incidental remedy dependent
wholly upon the statute and subsidiary to the main object of the action.
Such decisions lend no support to Dean Clark's conception of "cause of
action". They stand for the proposition that the mere existence of a num-
ber of different kinds of relief does not prove the existence of a number
of causes of action.
Next we turn our attention to a group of decisions illustrating the prop-
osition that there is but a single cause of action for a single breach of a
single right. In Baxter v. Camp,25 the defendant gave his wife an agree-
ment to pay her son a set sum after her decease if the son should survive
her. After her death, the son sued. He pleaded in two counts. In the first,
he sued on a promissory note. In the second, he set forth the circum-
n115 Minn. at 38, 131 N. W. at 796.
'Security Loan & Trust Co. v. Mattern, 131 Cal. 326, 63 Pac. 482 (1901) ; McMahon
v. Plum, 90 Conni. 281, 96 Atl. 958 (1916) ; Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N. Y. 109, 62 N. E. 135
(1901); Reichert v. Stilwell, 172 N.Y. 83, 64 N. E. 790 (1902).
"Supra note 22.
111d. at 114, 62 N. E. at 136.
"Supra note 22.
"71 Conn. 245, 41 At. 803, 42 L. R. A. 514 (1898).
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stances surrounding the making of the agreement, its delivery to him by
his mother, her death, demand for payment, and failure of the defendant
to meet the demand. The court declared that there should have been only
one count. Whatever cause there was for bringing the suit arose out of a
single transaction, and that was fully stated in the second count. The re-
sult is proper, for there is but one breach of a single right, that is, the
failure to pay money to which the plaintiff was entitled. The case at no
point says there is never more than one cause of action arising out of a
transaction.
Next we may consider suits in which amendments changed parties. In
Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Wulf,26 the plaintiff originally based her right
to recover on a Kansas statute and sued in her individual capacity. Her ac-
tion could legally rest only upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act,26a
which required the action to be brought in the name of the personal rep-
resentative of the deceased. She amended her statement of claim and sued
as administrator. The judges declared that there was no new cause of ac-
tion suggested by the amendment, for the change as to parties merely in-
dicated the new capacity in which the plaintiff was to prosecute the action.
In mentioning, in the amendment, the federal statute dealing with em-
ployers' liability, nothing new was added to the pleading, for the court
would take judicial notice of it under the original pleading, since that enact-
ment was the only proper basis for the plaintiff's suit. Surely, one cannot
correctly claim that this decision enunciates the doctrine proposed by Dean
Clark. All it says is that there is no change in claims sued upon when the
same person brings suit first in one capacity and then in another, and that
the court will take judicial notice of a statute essential to a cause of action.
Therefore, when the petition which, because of the doctrine, of judicial
notice, is treated as setting forth that enactment is amended actually to
state it, no new cause of action is declared upon. N. & G. Taylor Co. v.
Anderson27 merely agrees with the doctrine of the Wulf case, though it
decides that, under the particular facts, different causes of action were
stated in the original and amended declarations.
The familiar doctrine that when one sues upon a contract there is but
one cause of action for all of the breaches thereof which exist at the time
of the bringing of the action, and in relation to which no suit has been
previously begun, is illustrated by Downey v. Turner.28 In this case, a real
estate broker had a contract to be paid a certain percentage of the rentals
or sale price if he rented or sold property belonging to the defendant. He
rented the property with an option to purchase. The lessee later bought it.
"226 U. S. 570, 33 Sup. Ct. 135, 57 L. ed. 355 (1913).
-35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-59 (1934).
-14 F. (2d) 353 (C. C.A. 4th, 1926).
'"28 App. Div. 491, 51 N.Y. Supp. 105 (2d Dept. 1898).
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The broker sued to recover commissions due him. The holding was that
the plaintiff stated but one cause of action when he sued to recover a
commission for obtaining both the lease and the sale. Though the court at
no place in its decision stated that the breadth of a cause of action was de-
termined by trial convenience, the decision seems to imply some such doc-
trine. The cause of action includes various breaches of a single contract,
and the violations of the plaintiff's right occurred at different times. These
are matters which could be conveniently tried in one lawsuit. If this im-
plication exists, the case supports Dean Clark's proposition as to the extent
of a cause of action. Candor demands this admission.
Now, let us turn our attention to several proceedings in which the same
claim is pleaded under various theories. Worth v. Dunn29 considers a com-
plaint containing two counts. One alleged common-law negligence; the other
count stated that the defendants, by using dynamite in a place where many
people were gathered, were engaged in an intrinsically dangerous opera-
tion. The court said:
"The union of claims for relief upon more than one issue presented
in one count, where all arise out of the same transaction, is a convenient
and generally satisfactory method of procedure, and also the use of two
or more counts in stating the cause of action is frequently the only safe
method."29a
In all fairness, it must be noticed that the court uses the words "con-
venient and generally satisfactory method of procedure". That looks like
Dean Clark's conception of the proper test of the breadth of a "cause of
action". However, he can get but small consolation from this decision, for
it is clearly a suit in which there is but a single injury, and two counts,
not one, are pleaded. Therefore, what was said relating to the joining of
claims in one count is a dictum.
National Fuel Co. v. Green30 declares:
"There is no provision of the code requiring a plaintiff to state in
separate counts the several distinct matters on which he relies to sup-
port a single cause of action; consequently, in an action for personal
injuries, common-law and statutory negligence may be stated in the
same count, so long as the acts upon which the plaintiff relies produced
the one injury and the one damage constituting the subject-matter of
the action,S30a
Notice that here there is but one right involved and a single injury there-
to. Naturally, there is but a single cause of action. This remark applies to all
of the cases mentioned at the close of the next paragraph.
'98 Conn. 51, 118 Atl. 467, 12 A. L. R. 328 (1920).
11d. at 63, 118 AtI. at 471.
50 Colo. 307, 115 Pac. 709 (1911).
11Id. at 313, 115 Pac. at 711. Italics supplied.
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In DeWolf v. The A. & W. Sprague Manufacturing Co.,31 the plaintiff
held a judgment lien on realty. It was also encumbered by trust mortgages.
The plaintiff sued to have those mortgages set aside or to have them de-
clared void as against him, to have his judgment lien foreclosed, and to ob-
tain possession of the property involved. The court declared that the law
supported the right of the plaintiffs to join in one bill the several causes or
matters which the complaint embraced, and approved the following state-
ment of Judge Story:
"'The courts [equity courts] have always exercised a sound discre-
tion in determining whether the subject-matters of the suit are properly
joined or not, as also whether the parties, plaintiffs and defendants,
are or are not properly joined. And in new cases courts will be gov-
erned by those analogies which seem best founded in general conven-
sence and will best promote the due administration of justice, without
multiplying unnecessary litigation on the one hand or drawing suitors
into needless expenses on the other.' . . . It is stated by the same
authority that multifariousness 'is improperly joining in one bill dis-
tinct and independent matters, and thereby confounding them; as for
example the uniting in one bill of several matters perfectly distinct and
unconnected against one defendant, or the demand of several matters
of a distinct and independent nature against several in the same bill.'
Story, Eq. Pl., §271."131a
That part of these quotations which is placed in italics does speak of
"convenience", a word used in Dean Clark's definition of "cause of action".
However, if one reads on in Story, he learns that the author is speaking,
not of the meaning of "cause of action", but of the joinder of several causes
of action in one bill. Other decisions32 relating to pleading various theories
of an identical cause of action are referred to by Dean Clark to sustain his
proposals now under consideration.
Several cases now claim our attention,33 in each of which it is definitely
"49 Conn. 282 (1881).
'
1 d. at 285. Italics supplied.
"Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 29 AtI.
76, 25 L. R. A. 856 (1893) ; Aaronson v. City of New Haven, 94 Conn. 690, 110 Atl. 872,
12 A. L. R. 328 (1920) ; Raymond v. Bailey, 98 Conn. 201, 118 Atl. 915 (1922) ; White
v. St. Louis & Meramec River R. R. Co., 202 Mo. 539, 101 S.W. 14 (1906) ; Thomp-
son v. Keyes-Marshall Brothers Livery Co., 214 Mo. 487, 113 S. W. 1128 (1908);
Berry v. Majestic Milling Co., 240 S.W. 829 (Mo. App. 1922) ; Ford v. Dowell, 243
S.W. 366 (Mo. App. 1922) ; Payne v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 201 N.Y. 436, 95
N.E. 19 (1911).
'Purdy v. Watts, 91 Conn. 214, 99 AtI. 496 (1916); Root v. Connecticut Co., 94-
Conn. 227, 108 Atl. 506 (1919); Alfred E. Joy Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
98 Conn. 794, 120 Atl. 684 (1923); Hamnstrown v. New York Contracting Co., 122
App. Div. 43, 106 N.Y. Supp. 880 (1st Dept. 1907) ; Smith v. Earle, 202 App. Div. 305,
195 N.Y. Supp. 342 (1st Dept. 1922) ; Fleitmann & Co. Inc. v. Colonial Finance Cor-
poration, 203 App. Div. 827, 197 N.Y. Supp. 125 (1st Dept. 1922); Peacock v. Tata
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,stated that they involve several causes of action. Little need be said as to
-them except to name and locate them. In only one of these suits, Upson Co.
v. Erie R. Co.,34 is even the barest hint given that the extent of a cause of
action should be determined by trial convenience. In that case, there were
failures safely to deliver goods covered by different bills of lading. The
-court decided that a different cause of action existed for each misdelivery.
In a dictum, it stated that there might be only one cause of action for
damage caused by misdelivery of goods, if a pleading showed that the ar-
ticles included in different shipments were delivered to the consignee
;mingied in such a fashion that the particular shipment could not be sep-
arately identified or checked. As a reason for this possible result, the court
-declared:
"If the defendant has thus rendered it impossible to prove the par-
ticular loss on each shipment by commingling the goods in various ship-
ments, it would be unreasonable to allow the defendant to require from
the plaintiff proQf as to the particular damage to each separate ship-
ment."
34
a
The reason given for the result seems not to be based on the idea of
anaking trial convenience the test of the breadth of a cause of action;
rather, the court wishes to free a plaintiff from difficulties imposed by a
,defendant.
In addition to placing reliance on the judicial authorities which have
'been outlined, Dean Clark says he is "in the tradition among others of
Phillips, Code Pleading (1896) §30; Sibley, Right to, and Cause for Ac-
-tion (1902) 39, 40; Cook, "The Power of Congress under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause" (1919) 28 Yale L. 1. 421; and Judge Bliss' definition
is not far away, Bliss, Code Pleading (3rd ed. 1894) §113."35 These cita-
tions will now be considered.
Phillips says:
"And since both rights and delicts arise from operative facts, he
must affirm of himself such investitive fact or group of facts as will
.show a consequent legal right in him, and he must affirm of the ad-
versary party such culpatory fact or facts as will show his delict with
reference to the right so asserted. The formal statement of operative
facts showing such right and such delict shows a cause for action on
the part of the state and in behalf of the complainant, and is called, in
legal phraseology, a cause of action."
It is clear that, as far as Dean Clark claims a cause of action consists of
:Sons, 206 App. Div. 145, 200 N.Y. Supp. 656 (1st Dept. 1923) ; Sherlock v. Manwaren,
208 App. Div. 538, 203 N.Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dept. 1924) ; Upson Co. v. Erie R. Co.,
213 App. Div. 262, 210 N.Y. Supp. 112 (4th Dept. 1925).
"Supra note 33.
"Id. at 263, 210 N.Y. Supp. at 112.5Tke Cause of Action (1934) 82 U. oF PA. L. REv. 354, at p. 358, n. 18.
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facts, this excerpt favors him. On the other hand, the important part of
Dean Clark's definition which provides a pragmatic test for the extent of a
cause of action is not suggested by Phillips.
Sibley, referring to Pomeroy's Code Remedies, states:
"So far as I am aware, its conclusion as to the cause for, and right
to, action constitute its one vulnerable part. That the analysis upon
which they are founded is incomplete-the cases were not examined-
is demonstrated by the fact that the 'right' was not discriminated from
the 'cause'. About two years after the remedies appeared came the
equally able treatise on Code Pleading, by Mr. Bliss. This, as against
Mr. Pomeroy's view, but without discussing that, made the 'wrong'
alone the cause for action, in civil cases. The right to action, however,
was not particularly considered. Eight years later, the work by Judge
Phillips, whose views have been discussed, was given to the profession.
He marked the distinction between the right to, and cause for, action,
and pointed out the confusion into which Mr. Pomeroy had fallen
regarding them."
Surely, Sibley says no more than Phillips to sustain Dean Clark. It is not
even clear that he is writing concerning a cause of action.
Professor Cook declares:
"Like so many words and phrases in our legal vocabulary, 'cause
of action' is ambiguous. At times it is used to denote the group of oper-
ative facts to which the law attaches legal consequences which enable
the person with reference to whom the facts are true to obtain legal
relief through a judicial tribunal. As so used the phrase also connotes
the legal relations which the law attaches to such a group of facts. At
other times, however, the phrase is so used that it denotes the legal re-
lations which result from the facts and connotes that the facts are
true of the one who is asserted to have the 'cause of action'. Codes
of civil procedure use the phrase in the former sense when they re-
quire a plaintiff to 'state facts constituting his cause of action' in plain
and concise language. A common synonym of the phrase as used in the
latter sense is 'right of action', in which case the word 'right' is ob-
viously used in a generic sense and not in the specific sense as the
correlative of 'duty'."
Again, the author cited deals only with the type of the contents of a cause of
action, not with its breadth. Professor Cook, it should be remarked, says that
"cause of action", as that term is used in the code, not only includes the
facts but "also connotes the legal relations which the law attaches to such a
group of facts". Although this quotation from Professor Cook's writings
does not mention Dean Clark's trial convenience test as to the extent of a
"cause of action", it cannot be said that Dean Clark did not rely on Pro-
fessor Cook's ideas in announcing his principle, for Dean Clark has told
the writer that conversations with Professor Cook "were perhaps as much
a stimulus for my own thinking with reference to the cause of action as
anything I had read".
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Bliss says:
" We have defined an action to be a judicial proceeding for the
prevention or redress of a wrong. The 'cause of action' then, is the
'wrong'. In a given case, the second phrase at the head of this section
(facts constituting a cause of action) includes the first (a cause of
action) for there can be no cause of action aside from the facts which
constitute it; . . . If a right is denied, or an obligation ignored, or a
duty neglected, no cause of action is shown-that is, no wrong ap-
pears-without a statement of the facts showing the right or the ob-
ligation or the duty (or the relation) as well as its denial or the
neglect."
Admittedly, Bliss appears to say that facts are an essential element of a
cause of action. Observe also Bliss's assertion that no cause of action ap-
pears "without a statement of facts showing the right or the obligation or
the duty (or the relation)".
The writer has made an honest effort to give a thorough and accurate
-statement of the authorities upon which Dean Clark in his writings relies
to sustain his theory of the content of a cause of action, that we might
honestly determine whether or not his concept of a "cause of action" is
supported by the authorities he cites. The writer's conclusion is, and always
has been, that there is nothing new in that part of his definition which de-
clares that a code cause of action involves facts. The writer believes that
the opinions to which Dean Clark refers sustain his contention that facts
are one of the elements of every cause of action. But do the precedents which
he mentions, and which existed before he enunciated his theory in its final
form in 1928, hold that the breadth of a cause of action should be deter-
mined "pragmatically by the court, having in mind the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case", and that the controlling factor in deciding
the extent of such a cause ought to be "trial convenience"? Notice should
be taken of an approved quotation from Story which is found in DeWolf
v. The A. W. Sprague Manufacturing Co.8 6 There Story declares that "in
new cases courts will be governed by those analogies which seem best
founded in general convenience and will best promote the due administra-
tion of justice, . . . " Story, however, is referring to the joinder of causes
of action. It is not claimed that Professor Cook did not in conversations
suggest to Dean Clark the test that the latter has proposed as the proper
standard to be applied in determining what should be the extent of a cause
,of action. None of Professor Cook's writings cited by Dean Clark say that
pragmatism and trial convenience have any place in the definition of "cause
of action".
On the other hand, Downey v. Turner8 7 as will be recalled, holds that at
any particular time one has but a single cause of action for various breaches
'Supra notes 31, 31a. Italics supplied.
•'Supra note 28.
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of a contract in relation to which suit has not previously been brought. By
inference, this adopts the "trial convenience" test of the breadth of a
cause of action. A dictum in Worth v. Dunn38 that "the union of claims for
relief upon more than one issue presented in one count, where all arise out
of the same transaction, is a convenient and generally satisfactory method
of procedure", surely sustains the trial convenience standard. To the writer,
of the precedents already examined, only the two cases last mentioned can
properly be said to support Dean Clark's ideas concerning the extent of a
cause of action.
Therefore, though most of the documentary proof cited in Dean Clark's
writings demonstrates that he is an originator rather than a disciple in
defining "cause of action", it is certain that since his Code Pleading appeared
in 1928 he has acquired a small following of the most flattering nature.
Stafford Security Co., Inc., v. Kremer39 and Covey v. England and McCaf-
frey, Inc.,40 cite with approbation that part of Dean Clark's book which
defines "cause of action", but do not quote it or give a similar explanation
of the phrase in their own language. In Harriss v. Tams,41 the court goes
further and says:
"Perhaps the judicial formulation of a definite test in determining
what constitutes a different obligation or liability might hamper rather
than guide the courts. Perhaps to some extent the determination must
be made pragmatically based on considerations of fairness. See Clark
on Code Pleading, pp. 75, 83, 513. ' '41a
Without question, the court in this decision was referring to the meaning
of "cause of action", for it was dealing with an amendment of the plain-
tiff's complaint after the Statute of Limitations was said by the defendant
to have run against the cause of action which the amendment would set
forth, if permitted. The supreme compliment is paid Dean Clark in United
States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co.42 There the question was whether an
amended statement of claim alleged a cause of action different from the
one originally set forth. In the decision, Mr. Justice Cardozo cited Dean
Clark's Code Pleading at pages 83, 84, 504, and 505. At these points Dean
Clark states his definition of a cause of action, using the terms "aggregate
of operative facts", "trial convenience", and "aggregate of operative facts
of convenient size". It is certain that Mr. Justice Cardozo agrees in part
with Dean Clark, for he declares that at times, though not always, a cause
of action is "something separate from writs and remedies, the group of
operative facts out of which a grievance has developed". 42a Whether or not
'Supra notes 29, 29a.
"258 N.Y. 1, 179 N.E. 32 (1931).
4 233 App. Div. 332, 253 N.Y. Supp. 340 (4th Dept. 1931).
"258 N.Y. 229, 179 N.E. 476 (1932).
"aId. at 242, 179 N.E. at 482.
"288 U. S. 62, 53 Sup. Ct. 278, 77 L. ed. 619 (1933).
"'ad. at 68, 53 Sup. Ct. at 280.
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the Supreme Court approves Dean Clark's idea that trial convenience is to
determine the extent of a cause of action it is difficult to say, for at no
point in this decision are the words "trial convenience" or their equivalent
used, although reference is made to those pages of Dean Clark's book on
Code Pleading which do use that terminology.
Having completed an analysis of cases, the writer desires, courteously
and without "missionary fervor", to present personal ideas of the correct
meaning of "cause of action" as that term is used in the ordinary code.
No attempt will be made to cite authorities, as that has been done often
enough already.
Of what does a cause of action consist? Ordinarily, the codes declare that
the plaintiff's initial pleading shall contain "a plain and concise statement
of the facts constituting a cause of action". 43 There can be no question that
the enactment says one must plead the facts involved in a cause of action.
The cases usually hold that operative, not evidentiary, facts must be alleged.
However, the writer does not see why evidentiary facts may not be stated.
At times, to make matters clear, their allegation is essential, and the stat-
ute merely says facts are to be set forth. It does not state what type of
facts are to be alleged. Now, the assertion that facts are to be pleaded does
not necessarily mean that a cause of action consists only of facts. The lack
of reference in this legislation to statements of law merely excuses one
from setting forth any of such averments, even though they are part of a
cause of action. If the statute had directed that one "plead his cause of
action, which shall consist of facts", the result would at least have sug-
gested that the legislatures said they believed that facts alone *constituted a
cause of action. But even their opinion embodied in a legislative enactment
could not make a cause of action have fewer component parts than, in the
very nature of things, it must have. By no stretch of the imagination can a
cause of action exist without a combination of facts and legal rights and
duties. If the legal aspect of a cause of action is wanting why should courts
and sheriffs, which exist largely to enforce rights and duties, be inter-
ested in acting? This reasoning applies if one believes that the law theoreti-
cally determines that certain rights and duties exist to be applied to facts
occurring later, or if he thinks that facts take place and that because of
such happening rights and duties come into existence.
Our next desire is to consider the extent of a cause of action. If the
writer could be mentally honest and do it, he would be happy to think of
the breadth of a cause of action in terms of trial convenience. The reason
for this is that it would be an easy way to avoid difficulties thrown in the
path of the pleader by the law which does not permit one to set forth a
new cause of action in an amended statement of claim, and by enactments
*'For a list of these statutes, see Wheaton, Manner of Stating Cause of Action
(1934) 20 CORNELL L. Q. 185, n. 1.
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which relate to joinder. If this test of the range of a cause of action ex-
isted, one would not have to try to get courts or legislators to permit
amendments to state new causes of action. This effort must be expended
to avoid great losses of time, energy, and money in some cases, if a nar-
rower view of the extent of a cause of action is taken. It is very largely
this idea, it is believed, that leads disciples of the trial convenience theory to
adopt it.
But, as serviceable as that doctrine is, the terms of the usual law prevent
one from adopting it. All lawyers are familiar with the statutes which
permit a joinder of causes of action which arise out of the same trans-
action.44 Legislators passing these laws could scarcely have conceived a
cause of action as covering all matters which can be conveniently tried
together, for they clearly intimate that several causes of action may arise
out of the same transaction. Yet, surely all matters arising out of the
same transaction can, ordinarily be advantageously dealt with in one
law suit.
Some statutes make no mention of causes of action arising out of the
same transaction.45 They merely state, sometimes with exceptions, that the
plaintiff may join any causes of action which he has against the defendant.
In those states the argument used against the standard of trial convenience
in the commonwealths having statutes providing for joinder of causes of
action arising out of the same transaction is unavailable. But even in the
jurisdictions providing for the joinder in a single suit of all the actions one
may have against another, as well as in those containing same-transaction
statutes, the law often provides different statutes of limitation for different
types of injuries. Moreover, in many of those states tort actions for personal
injuries die with the person, whereas other actions do not. The first class
of laws indicates that the different statutes of limitations deal with different
causes of action; the second implies that there are separate causes of action
involved, some of which survive and some of which do not. Suppose, for
instance, that A, in the presence of a crowd, should call B a thief, assault
and batter him, destroy some of B's personalty, and have B arrested. All
of these occurrences and the legal rights and duties connected with them
could be tried together conveniently in one lawsuit. It is doubtful, how-
ever, that there is a state in this country in which the claimant has the
same time in which to begin a proceeding to recover for all these different
types of injuries and in which the right to obtain damages for each of them
survives the death of the person harmed. It is clear, therefore, that the
legislatures of this country have definitely indicated that the courts are not
to apply the test of trial convenience in determining the extent of a
"For a list of these statutes, see Wheaton, A Study of the Statutes Which Contain
the Term "Subject of the Action" &c. (1932) 18 CORNELL L. Q. 20, n. 1, 2, 4. 5.
"
5Wheaton, supra note 44, n. 6-13.
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cause of action. These statutes bind the courts, for they cannot define the
extent of a cause of action in disregard of such legislative enactments.
Now suppose there is a jurisdiction having the usual statute relating to
the manner of stating a cause of action, but no statute limiting its courts'
ideas of the proportions of a cause of action. In such a situation, the writer
sees no reason why trial convenience should not be the proper yardstick by
which to measure the span of a cause of action. It would be practical, and
the necessity of a long battle with legislatures to free clients from losses
caused by their lawyers' mistakes in pleading, and to obtain a greater free-
dom of joinder of causes of action, would be eliminated. That different
types of legal rights and duties might be involved in a single cause of ac-
tion need not bother. Ancient history should not permanently fetter legal
progress.
The writer's final conclusion, then, is that a cause of action, under the
customary statutes, consists of facts, and legal- rights and duties. One must
state the facts involved in his cause of action. One should be permitted to set
forth both ultimate and evidentiary facts. One may not state legal con-
clusions-a limitation, as is elsewhere argued at length,46 which should be
eliminated because of the great confusion existing in the minds of lawyers
as to what is law and what is fact. The breadth of a cause of action, if not
limited by statutes, might well be determined by trial convenience as long
as the facts included were connected in some way. But where legislative
enactments relating to joinder, limitation, and survival of actions exist, they
indicate that there can be but one type of legal right connected with a single
cause of action, and thus they prevent the application of the trial-convenience
test of the extent of a cause of action. The result is that those who want the
law to provide a pragmatic definition of a cause of action must roll up their
sleeves and fight for that result. Legislators and rule-making bodies as well as
judges must be convinced of the inadequacy of the present concept of a
cause of action. Many will struggle for its retention, but the change can and
will be made if enough intelligent thought and effort are devoted to secur-
ing it.
"Wheaton, loc. cit. supra note 43.
